Possibilistic logic has been proposed as a nu merical formalism for reasoning with uncertainty.
Introduction
There has been a great deal of interest in the relationship between numeric and non-numeric approaches to uncer tain reasoning. Possibilistic has been proposed as one such numeric formalism (see (Dubois and Prade 1988) for and introduction), providing necessity measures, which deter mine the degree of certainty associated with an item of belief, and the dual possibility measures, determining the degree of surprise associated with (or the willingness to ac cept) a potential belief. Naturally, qualitative accounts of possibilistic logic have been proposed and shown to corre spond to these measures (Dubois 1986) . Such qualitative characterizations give us the ability to express possibilistic relationships without having to assume particular numerical values, relying only on the relative possibility of proposi tions.
A logic of qualitative possibility is crucial if we wish to derive consequences based on partial information. Given some constraints on the relationship between certain propo sitions, certain other constraints may be required to hold on any suitable possibility measure. A logical calculus permits us to specify a partial (qualitative) possibility measure and derive information implicit in the specification. We can rea son without requiring complete information. One such pos sibilistic logic is developed in (Farinas and Herzig 1991) .
Others have provided logics in which logical constraints on probabilities can be specified in an analogous fashion (see, e.g., (Bacchus 1990 ; Frisch and Haddawy 1988) , though these retain the quantitative aspects of probabilities).
Given the nature of necessity and possibility measures, the connection to modal logics is also of great interest (Dubois and Prade 1988) since the latter are typically put forth as representation systems for notions of possibility and neces sity. We will present two modal logics, CO and CO*, in which we can faithfully represent the notions of qualita tive necessity and possibility. These representations will respect the essential qualities of possibility and necessity measures. The expressive power we need to capture pos sibilistic logic is achieved with two modalities: the usual o, corresponding to truth at accessible worlds; and the less standard a, expressing truth at inaccessible worlds. We note that, in contrast to many multimodal logics used in knowledge representation, the additional modality carries no excess semantical baggage. Our semantics is based on the usual Kripke structures for monomodal logics, the added modal operator increasing only our ability to constrain the form of such structures. The correspondence does not use the (perhaps expected) mapping of qualitative necessity and possibility into the operators o and 0. However, we pro vide other operators, defined using 0 and a that do capture these absolute notions.
Aside from demonstrating that simple modal logics can be used to express qualitative possibility, the embedding into CO and CO* also illustrates important connections to a number of other formalisms for defeasible reasoning (which have also been mapped onto our logics). Some of these include conditional approaches to default reasoning (Lehmann 1989) , <:·semantics (Pearl 1988) , belief revision (Gat"denfors 1988) , counterfactuallogics (Lewis 1973 ) and autoepistemic logic (Moore 1985; Levesque 1990) . In the next section we discuss qualitative possibility and present the logics CO and CO*. We show how these logics may be used to represent qualitative possibility. In Section 3, we examine the connections between possibilistic logic and some other systems for defeasible reasoning. Of particular interest is the fact we can define a conditional for default reasoning in terms of our possibility logics that is identical to Pearl's (1988) conditional for e-semantics. This rela-tionship has bee n examined by Dubois and Prade (199la) , but our formulation has independent motivation, and lends itself to a complete calculus of conditionals. Furthermore, the expressive power of our logics allows us to express important properties that cannot be stated otherwise.
A Modal Representation of Possibility

Poss ibilistic Logic
Possibilistic logic has bee n developed to a great extent by Dubois and Prade (see their (1988) for a survey). A possi bility measure II maps the sentences of LcPL into the real interval [0, 1]. The value II( a) is intended to represent the degree of possibility of a. We take this to represent the amount of surprise associated with adopting a as an epis temic possibility. If II( a) = 1 there is no surprise (i.e., a is consistent with the agent's beliefs), while II( a) = 0 in dicates that surprise is maximal (i.e., an agent would never adopt a). A possibility measure must satisfy the following three properties:
A necessity measure N is a similar mapping, associating with a a degree of necessity. We take N(a) to represent the amount of surprise associated with giving up belief in a (or the degree of entrenchment of a in a belief set; see Section 4). If N(a) = 1 then a is fully entrenched and can never be given up, while N(a) = 0 indicates that a is not believed at all. Naturally, tbe degree of surprise associated with giving up a belief a should be related to the degree of surprise in accepting -.a as an epistemic possibility, for giving up a is just accepting -.a as possible. Indeed, one may define necessity measures using the identity N(a) = 1-11(-.a).
Qualitative necessity measures are discussed in (Dubois and Prade 1991b; Farinas and Herzig 1991) . Postulates are proposed constraining the qualitative relationship a ?: N /3, which is read as "a is at least as necessary as /3." If we define a?: N /3 to be true just when N(a)?: N(/3) for any necessity measure N, then ?: N will satisfy the postulates for qualitative necessity (in finite settings), and these relations are the only ones that can be so-defined (Dubois 1986 Farinas and Herzig (1991) have axiomatized this notion with a logic called qualitative possibility logic (QPL) , in which the relation �II' is incorporated as a conditional con nective. They also make an initial attempt to develop a modal theory of possibility that uses only unary modal op erators in place of the conditional ?:�r· Unfortunately, the resulting logic PL requires an infinite set of modal operators, each corresponding to a unique member of the measure set for II. Semantically, each operator is evaluated with respect to a separate accessibility relation. This certainly permits the expression of qualitative properties like a ?:�r /3, but doesn't seem to reflect the qualitative nature of QPL or other qualitative postulates. In particular, there is no modal operator corresponding to (some degree of) possibility or necessity. This appears to be the first logical axiomatization of qualitative possibility and, as such, provides many of the advantages we expect of a logical calculus. Furthermore, they show QPL is equivalent to Lewis's {1973) logic VN.
The Logics CO and CO•
We wish to provide a possible worlds semantics for quali tative possibility theory, taking our models to consist of a set W of possible worlds and a binary accessibility rela tion R over W. Intuitively, W is the set of situations an agent considers possible. We do not intend this to represent epistemic possibility, for there will be worlds among this set that are inconsistent with an agent's beliefs. Rather, these are the set of worlds an agent could possibly consider adopting, even if it changed its mind about certain beliefs it currently possesses. For example, W could be the set of physically or logically possible worlds (for an agent).
We take R to be a ranking of. these worlds according to their degree of possibility or plausibility, the extent to which an agent is willing to accept these worlds as epistemically possible, or consistent with its beliefs. When wRv we intend that vis at least as possible as w. Intuitively, when v is more possible than w we can think of v as being "more consistent" with an agent's current beliefs than w; or tbink of v as a preferable, more plausible alternative state of affairs for an agent to adopt should it be forced to choose between the two.
We take as minimal requirements tbat R be reflexive and transitive.2 Another requirement we adopt in this paper is that of connectedness. In other words, any two states of affairs must be comparable according to their degree of possibility. If neither is more possible than the other, then they are equally possible.
If we intend the possibility ranking to respect an agent's current belief set, then it ought to be the case that the max- Figure 1 : A CO-model imally possible worlds in this ranking be precisely those the agent considers not merely possible, but epistemically possible (i.e., those worlds consistent with its beliefs). Al though we do not need to enforce this constraint to deal with possibilistic logic, we will discuss how this can be expressed in Section 3, and how beliefs are related to pos sibi1ity measures.
We now define a modal language with which we can ex press qualitative notions of possibility and necessity. Our language L will be formed from a denumerable set P of propositional variables, together with the connectives ...., , :::) , 0 and 5. The connectives/\, v and= are defined in terms of these in the usual way. We use T and .i to denote the identically true and false propositions, respectively. We denote by LcPL the propositional sublanguage of L.
Definition (Boutilier 1991 ) A CO-model is a triple M � (W, R, !{)}, where W is a set (of possible worlds), R is a transitive, connected3 binary relation on W (the accessibility relation), and V' maps P into 2w (I{)( A)
is the set of worlds where A is true).
A CO-model consists of a set of clusters of possible worlds totally-ordered by R, where a cluster is a set of mutually ac cessible, or equally possible, worlds. In Figure 1 
Nee From A infer DA.
MP From A :::) B and A infer B.
Provability and derivability are defined in the usual way, in terms of theoremhood (Hughes and Cresswell 1984 ) .
Theorem 1 {Boutilier 1991) l-eo a W"F=co a.
We often want to ensure that all logically possible worlds are taken into consideration in our models (for instance in the context of belief revision (Boutilier 1992c) or au toepistemic reasoning (Levesque 1990; Boutilier 1992b) ).
In our current setting, we can think of this as ensuring that every logically possible world ts assigned some positive degree of possibility. For this purpose we introduce the logic co•, which is based on the class of CO-models in which all propositional valuations are represented (see also (Levesque 1990) 
A Modal Account
We now take up the task of providing a simple modal ac count of qualitative possibility and necessity. Recall that a CO-structure orders worlds according to their degree of possibility. This is much like another formulation of possi bilistic logic in terms of possibility distributions. A distri bution 1r assigns to each world a degree of possibility from the interval [0, 1]. This too can be viewed as a ranking of worlds, with w being at least as possible as v just when 1r(w) :;:: 1r(v), corresponding precisely to vRw in a CO model. A distribution determines a possibility measure II via the following relationship: II(A) = max{1r(w) : w F= A}. In other words, the degree of possibility of A is just that of the most possible A-world.
In our qualitative setting we need not determine the absolute possibility of A, merely the relative possibility of pairs of sentences. Quantitatively, A is at least as possible as B iff the world of maximal possibility satisfying A (say w) is no less possible than the most possible B-world (say v); that is, 1r(w):;:: 1r(v). In a CO-structure this means vRw. So if A is at least as possible as B, then it must be the case that the minimal B-world in relation R can see the minimal A world.5 But, since vis a minimal B-world, all B-worlds see v; therefore, any B-world can see w (since R is transitive and connected). More generally, whenever A is at least as possible as B, any B-world can see some A-world. In our bimodal language this is expressed as D{B :J <>A): whenever B holds, there is some more plausible world satisfying A. We refer to this as a plausibility ordering (for reasons discussed in the next section).
Definition Let M be a CO-model. The plausibility order ing determined by M is $PM· given by
. A is at least as plausible as B iff A $PM B.6 4 For all wE W, w
• is defined as the map from Pinto {0,1} such that w•(A) = 1 iff w E 'P(A); in other words, w• is the valuation associated with w.
' we are speaking loosely here, of course. World w is a minimal A-world iff vRw for all A-worlds v. (Worlds minimal in R have maximal plausibility.) In this case w is "less than" any such v according to R, but (on our interpretation of R) has "greater" possibility than v. Nothing about CO-structures presupposes the existence of minimal A-worlds for any A, nor need they be unique when they do exist. We use this manner of speaking for illustrative purposes; but nothing of a technical nature depends on this.
6 We use $PM to indicate greater plausibility rather than �PM to remain consistent with (Grove 1988; Boutilier 1992a ) and other papers (where this operator is related to other concepts). The dual of such a relationship is qualitative necessity, and we refer to this ordering as an entrenchment ordering (again, explained in the next section).
Definition Let M be a CO-model. The entrenchment or dering determined by M is $EM, given by
It is easy to see that B $EM A iff M F= o (-,A :J <>..,B). Figure 2 shows a CO-model where A, B, ..,B and C are each more plausible than -,A. Every world where -,A holds is strictly less plausible than some world where these other propositions hold. We also see that A 1\ -,c is more plau sible than -,A 1\ C. A and C are equally (and maximally) plausible, yet A is more entrenched than C. This is due to the fact that as we "move up" from the bottom cluster, we find a -,c�world before a -.A-world. -.Cis more read ily "accepted" than -,A, so Cis less entrenched. Notice, since there are no worlds satisfying (say) -,A 1\ -,B in the model, we judge all such worlds to have no plausibility, 1r ( w) = 0. Correspondingly, according to our definition of $p M, -.A 1\ -.B is (strictly) less plausible than any sen tence satisfied in the model. Furthermore, every sentence in the language is at least as plausible as -.A 1\ -,B. That is, o '5:PM -.A 1\ -.B for all a (including a = J.). Thus, we see that II( -.A 1\ -.B) = 0. As mentioned above, one should think of the R-minimal worlds in a model (those with maximal plausibility) as representing the epistemic state of the agent in question. In other words, each minimal world is epistemically possible. In this example, we consider the two lowest worlds to be those consistent with the agent's beliefs, while all other worlds violate some belief. Here, the agent believes A 1\ C. In the next section we will see how belief can be expressed at the object level.
We can show two key results concerning this model of qualitative possibility.
Theorem 3 Any entrenchment ordering determined by a CO-model M is a qualitative necessity ordering satisfying postulates (Nl) through (N6). there is a CO-model M detennining the corresponding en tre nchment orrlering: A �EM B iff A � N B.
These results show that necessity orderings and entrench ment orderings determined by CO are exactly the same. It inunediately follows that the space of plausibility order ings determined by CO-models corresponds precisely to the set of qualitative possibility orderings. The first theorem is easy to verify using the de finition of A 5EM B and the logical properties of CO. The second theorem can be shown as follows: we consider the corresponding qualita tive possibility measure� .. and constrUct a CO-model that determines the plausibility ordering (it is easy to see that the dual entrenchment and necessity orderings will then be equivalent as well). We can constrUct a CO-model M us ing as worlds the maximal consistent sets of LcPL (which determine the obvious valuations). We define cuts on the language as any set C � LcPL such that if A E C and A � .. B then B E C (see Grove (1988) , who uses this technique). We exclude from M all worlds that intersect only the minimal cut. {A : l. � ... A}, and define accessi bility as follows:
wRv iff every cut C that intersects v also inter sects w (i.e., v n C :f: 0 implies w n C :f: 0). 
Beliefs and Conditionals
Beliefs
We have seen how to express qualitative possibility and necessity measures using two modal operators. More im portantly, the relationship to CO allows us to exhibit con nections between possibility theory and other forms of de feasible reasoning. We begin by explaining the choice of Thus, a is believed just when it has some degree of neces sity. Entrenchment and qualitative necessity correspond if we ignore (N4) and (E5). Entrenchment fails to satisfy (N4) only when every sentence is equally entrenched (including J.. ); that is, when we are dealing with the inconsistent belief set. We will ignore this case and assume that entrenchment orderings are nontrivial, satisfying (N4). 7
Qualitative necessity fails to satisfy (E5) because certain nontautologous beliefs are allowed to be certain or com pletely necessary (i.e •• N(a) = 1). In general, entrench ment orderings determined by CO-models will not satisfy (E5). But if we consider only CO*-models, every logi cally consistent a has some degree of possibility, and every contingent sentence will be less cenain than T. Thus (E5) is satisfied by the full qualitative necessity ordering deter mined by any CO*-model.
Theorem S (Boutilier 1992b) Any entrenchment orrkring determined l7y a CO*-model satisfies (El)-(E5).
Theorem 6 (Boutilier 1992b) For any entrenchment or· de ri ng 5E there is a CO*-model M detennining the corre sponding entrenchment ordering: A 5EM B iff A 5E B.
Of course, the real reason for examining logics of qualitative necessity and possibility is to provide a method of express· ing and reasoning with qualitative constraints on necessity and possibility (i.e., premises) without relying on complete knowledge of, say, a possibility ordering or measure. Given certain constraints we can determine through logical deduc tion what must be trUe in all measures or orderings satisfying 'We can capture the trivial ordering by considering the empty "CO-model'' as a model for entrenchment Axiomatically we can express the ordering using the inconsistent theory { l.}. these constraints. The expressive power of CO and CO* can also be used to capture notions that are not amenable to direct analysis using a simple language of qualitative necessity or possibility (e.g., Farinas and Herzig's QPL).
Naturally, we'd like to express relationships of qualitative possibility. In QPL one may assert A �. B, while in CO we say D(B ::> <>A) to indicate that A is as possible as B.
Absolute concepts such as belief, disbelief, possibility and necessity are important as well. These can also be asserted in QPL; for example, '"'A is believed" is just T > • ..,A. In CO, these modalities can be expressed as follows:
• When a is believed it must have some degree of neces sity (N(a) > 0). In CO this is expressible as ODa.
This is true exactly when there is some point is the model where a holds at all more plausible worlds. In particular, such a point exists when a holds at the most possible worlds (assuming such a limit). We define a modality for belief in this way, Ba denoting ooa. The model in Figure 2 satisfies BA and BG. It is easy to verify that CO satisfies the axioms of the belief logic weak S5 when B is taken as a modal operator.
Thus, qualitative possibility respects some reasonable conditions on the beliefs it determines. Some of the more notable properties are the introspective axioms, which are valid in CO:
Ba :> BBa and ..,sa :> 8-,Ba
Notice that Ba and 8-.a are mutually inconsistent, but a and 8-.a are not.
• Disbelief is expressed as -.Ba. This is true just when N(a) = 0, or 11(-,a) = 1. Notice that -.Ba and ..., a..., a are mutually consistent. The model in Figure 2 satisfies -.BB and -.8-.B.
• If a has some degree of possibility (11(-.a) > 0), ..,a cannot be certain. This holds exactly when Oa is verified (a is true at some world with a nonzero degree of possibility).
• Finally, a is completely necessary (N(a) = 1) exactly when Da holds. The model inFigure 2 satisfies D(Av B) since A V B holds at each world (it is completely necessary) • ..,A 1\ -.B is accorded no possibility at all. Some degree of necessity is assigned to a (N( a) > 0) just when it is believed; that is, Ba is true. So, in the example, B and -.B have a necessity measure of zero (since neither is believed). A and Care accorded some (less than absolute) degree of necessity, with A being more necessary (or entrenched) than C.
CO and CO* are much stronger than this. In particular, these logics allow us to express the concept of only knowing. To only know (or only believe) a sentence a is to believe a and to believe nothing more than is required by a (Levesque 1990 ). For example, given a (finite) knowledfe base KB, we usually intend that KB is all that is believed. If KB f= a 8 We will often use KB as if it were the conjunction of its elements (a sentence). For a fuller discussion of only knowing see (Levesque 1990; Boutilier 1992b To express that the sentences in KB are believed in QPL, we need only assert that T >. KB (or that N(KB) > 0 in a quantitative setting). But there are no convenient and systematic means of asserting that these are the only beliefs, or that these are the only sentences that have some positive degree of necessity.
In CO, we can express the fact that KB is all that is believed using the sentence
Typically, we consider only CO*-models when discussing "all that is known," for this terminology suggests that no logical possibilities should be excluded from consideration. When KB is believed, only KB-worlds can be accepted as epistemically possible. When KB is all that is believed, not only should KB be believed, but every KB-world should be accepted as epistemically possible. If some world is not accepted, then there should be some belief that excludes this world from consideration, some belief falsified by that world. If a world satisfies KB, there is no such belief when KB is all that is believed.
For purely propositional KB we have that (Boutilier 1992b ) for details). In particular, the only sentences assigned a degree of necessity greater than 0 are those entailed by KB. In a natural and convenient fash ion we can summarize what would require an infinite set of sentences in QPL, (or an unwieldy number for finite languages). The model in Figure 2 satisfies O(A 1\ C), assuming a language with only three atoms (and ignoring the fact that this is not a CO*-model). Thus, O(A 1\ C) is a concise way of expressing that only the consequences of A 1\ C are assigned a positive degree of necessity. Again, this is crucial since, when one specifies some knowledge base KB, it is usually intended that only those sentences derivable from KB are believed.
The expressive power of CO goes beyond this, however. Nothing prevents the occurrence of nonpropositional sen tences in KB. We can have belief sentences in KB, and even sentences of an autoepistemic nature. In fact, in (Boutilier 1992b) we show that co• subsumes autoepistemic logic. So we can think of co• as adding to qualitative possi bility logic the ability to express autoepistemic reasoning. With this connection, of course, degrees of possibility or entrenchment can be interpreted as generalizing autoepis temic logic as well.
Conditionals
CO has been used as a conditional logic for representing default rules. In (Boutilier 1990; Boutilier 1991) we define a conditional connective=>. reading A => B as "A normally implies B." We can show that co•, used in this way, captures Lehmann's (1989) rational consequence relations and Pearl's (1988) €-semantics. This connective can be related to our plausibility orderings as follows:
In other words, A � B holds just when A A B is more possible than A A ..., B (or A is impossible, II(A) = 0).
With a little simplification of these conditions, we obtain the definition of the connective� as presented by Boutilier (1990; 1991) 
Thus we can define an inferential relation on conditional sentences (or default rules) using qualitative possibility, and it will be equivalent to a number of other systems of defeasible inference. These include the following systems (whose relationship to CO is explored in the corresponding references): Pearl's (1988) €-semantics (Boutilier 1992d; Boutilier 1990 ); Lehmann's (1989) preferential and ratio nal consequence relations (Boutilier 1990) ; the purely con ditional fragment of Lewis's (1973) counterfactual logic VC (Boutilier 1992c ). As discussed above, Gru-denfors and Makinson's (1991) notion of expectation inference, based on their expectation orderings, also corresponds to this sort of conditional possibilistic inference (ignoring the trivial expectation ordering), a connection they point out. We note that most of these equivalences rely on our specifi cation of qualitative necessity and possibility in terms of nonfinite languages.
Example Let A, S, E stand for "adult", "grad student" and "employed", respectively, and consider the following set of premises (a standard example from the default reasoning literature):
Our conditionals are exception-allowing since A A -,E is consistent with this theory. Preference for more specific defaults is automatically incorporated into the definition of � as well. From this theory we can deriveS 1\ A � -,E using consequence in CO, but we cannot derive S 1\ A => E. Also derivable are constraints on permissible possibility assignments, for example, it must be that A >,. S. It is more plausible that someone is simply an adult than a grad student.
The relationship with €-semantics holds particular interest since its semantic foundations rely on probabilistic notions.
By presenting qualitative possibility andc-semantics within our modal framework we can show the following equiva lence. We assume a __... {3 is some abstract conditional, being interpreted either as => in CO or as a default rule in the sense of €-semantics (we assume a is satisfiable).
Theorem 8 Let T be a finite conditional theory consisting of sentences of the form a -{3, where a, {3 E LcPL-Then T l-eo a--+ {3 if!T €-entails a--+ {3.
This follows from the results of (Boutilier 1990) and (Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor 1990) , but a direct proof of this result is given in (Boutilier 1992a ).
This connection has also bee n examined by Dubois and Prade (199la) . Using CO as the intermediate framework between s-semantics and qualitative possibility allows us to see the underlying semantic commonality in these sys tems. Adams's (1975) construction for determining the consistency of theories of statements about arbitrarily high probabilities can be interpreted as ranking possible worlds according to their degree of probability. Given this ranking, it is easy to ensure that the conditional probabilities of the statements in the theory are as high as they need to be. But this ranking can also be construed as a simple CO-model.
Our interpretation of CO-models in this paper equates this ranking with the degree of possibility of worlds. On ei ther interpretation of the models, the same conclusions are derivable from simple conditional theories.
The results of Boutilier (1990) also show that €-semantics can be modeled in the monomodal logic S4.9 Thus for the purely conditional fragment of qualitative possibility theories, representation and inference can be performed using S4 (and conversel(;, if S4 is restricted to its simple "conditional" fragment). 0
Once we allow boolean combinations of conditionals, it is not clear that the intuitions underlying Adams's approach remain viable. Our semantics for qualitative possibility is more compelling in this case. We must also contrast our approach with the model of conditional possibility adopted by Dubois and Prade (1991a) . They provide a semantics for (some) boolean combinations of conditionals defined in terms of possibility measures. Unfortunately, they equate the ''weak negation" of a conditional-,(A � B) with the "strong negation" A � -,B. This is certainly not the case on our definition of conditionals. Merely denying a conditional is not reason to accept that the antecedent justifies acceptance of the negation of the consequent. It should bequite reasonable to say "My door is not (normally) open or closed." In CO, the following is consistent:
-,(A=> B) A -,(A=> ..,B).
Our extension of the conditional language is much more compelling in this respect.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented two modal logics for reasoning about orderings of qualitative necessity and possibility. The ex pressive power of CO and co• can be used to express constraints on possibility measures in a natural and concise 9 See also (Boutilier 1992a ) for a more detailed presentation. 1 0 We note that S4 structures are precisely CO-models without the requirement of connectedness. While this relaxation is not appropriate in general, simple conditional theories cannot express the distinction between the two types of structures. Thus the simple fragment of the (mono-) modal logic S4.3 (characterized by the class of connected, or CO, models) is also equivalent to these logics. See (Boutilier 1990 ) for details.
fashion (for example, through only knowing). As pointed out by a number of people, the numbers attached to proposi tions by possibility measures are perhaps ofless importance than the ranking of the propositions. We are ab le to exploit this fact in developing a simple semantic account of qual itative possibility. This simple view allows us to exhibit the connection between possibility theory and a number of other forms of defeasible reasoning. Furthermore, these modal possibilistic logics provide a means of representing very general constraints on possibility measures, since we allow arbitrary boolean combinations of formulae.
A number of avenues remain to be explored. By generaliz ing the logic CO. we can explore weaker types ofpossibilis tic semantics. For example, by dropping the requirement of connectedness (obtaining the logic CT40 of (Boutilier 1992a)) we are in essence model ing partially ordered pos sibilistic measure sets. Though we have demonstrated or pointed to a number of connections to exi sting systems of defeasible reasoning, some of these remain to be explored in detail. A number of other interesting relationships are brought to light by this work as well. Possibilistic logic has strong ties to Shafer's belief functions (Dubois and Prade 1991b) . This suggests a link to the fo rms of defeasible reasoning discussed in the last section, a connection we have yet to explore. We have also begun prel iminary in vestigations into the rel ationship between our conditional approaches to default reasoning based on CO* and proba bilistic systems of reasoning such as that of Bacchus (1990) , which could possibly bring to light further connections to possibilistic logic.
